There's been tremendous controversy over using student test scores to measure which teachers are most effective. Through its "Race to the Top" grants, the Obama Administration has encouraged states to use test scores as part of the mix, but not make them the sole determinant.
While teachers, politicians, talk show pundits and parents debate the issue, New York City is already using student test scores to measure its schools. And the results have provided lots of confusion.
Mayor Michael Bloomberg's administration took a tip from Florida when it introduced A-F letter grades for schools back in 2007. These report cards are called progress reports because they measure how much progress schools make in helping to increase student achievement.
Eighty-five percent of a school's grade is based on state test scores. The remaining 15 percent is based on surveys of a school's environment by teachers, parents and students. But it's not really so simple. Within this formula, the city compares individual schools to 40 other "peer schools." It also compares them to the citywide average.
This way, the city can see whether a school in a wealthy neighborhood of Brooklyn, for example, has made more progress with its fourth graders than a school in Harlem. If the school in Harlem made more progress even though it had lower scores than the school in Brooklyn, it can wind up with an A while the Brooklyn school gets a C. Schools also get extra credit if scores go up for English Language Learners and special education students, as well as others considered at a higher academic risk.
Last year, scores on the state's math and reading tests went up by more than 10 percentage points in New York City. As a result, 97 percent of city schools got A's and B's. But this year, New York State decided to make its tests harder to pass. The state acknowledged that its exams had gotten too easy and is now phasing in higher, national standards. By requiring students to get more correct answers this year, the percentage of students deemed proficient fell by more than 25 points in New York City and throughout the state.
The city tried to compensate for every school's lack of progress by grading them on a curve. Only 60 percent of schools got A's and B's when the grades came out in late September. There were also more D's and F's. Not surprisingly, principals groused when their grades went down.
The Earth School in Manhattan's East Village went from a B to a D. The principal of the well-regarded elementary school, Alison Hazut, told WNYC Radio the grading system is flawed because it still relies on a single year's scores. "All the small schools like ours, especially schools that are trying to be diverse and progressive, we're all fluctuating all over the map so how can that be?" she asked.
The city's answer is that it needs to rely on a single year's scores to avoid letting schools slide based on prior accomplishments, and to reward schools that make improvements. It also claims that its progress reports have been getting more accurate over time as it adjusts the formulas. But principals, teachers and parents are still confounded when they see schools with excellent reputations wind up with lower grades than those where only 40 or 50 percent of students are considered proficient.
Now that the city and the state are moving ahead with a new way of measuring teachers, everyone will be watching the role of test scores. And if the progress reports are any measure, there will be lots of questions when teachers finally do get their own marks.
What Did The Arabs Really Win In The 1973 War With Israel?
To the Arabs, the "victories" of the October 1973 (Tenth of Ramadan) War proved that Israel was not invincible. To the Israelis, the Yom Kippur War proved that even when taken by nominal surprise, its military can strike back with tactical superiority.
But in the 37 years since, the Arab World has little to show in terms of victories; in fact, the events stemming from the 1967 Naksa (disaster) and the October 1973 War helped create the Middle East mess we find ourselves in today.
The swift and decisive Israeli victory on June 6, 1967 unmasked the empty rhetoric of Pan-Arab nationalism.
Fawaz Gerges, an expert on Islamic jihadist organizations and author of The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, told me in 2007 that the 1967 defeat and its aftershocks "can be considered the most pivotal event which helps us understand why Islamic militancy has become a potent force in the region".
Disillusioned nationalists abandoned socialism in favor of Islamism, and the power of radical groups began to grow. This continues to be the trend today.
In 1973, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat planned to cross the Suez, penetrate the Israel Bar Lev defense line and hold ground for a few hours, proving that he could go the distance with Israel, while the US State Department pressed Tel Aviv to negotiate over the return of Sinai. Syria's Hafez Al Assad wanted to retake the Golan through a decisive military victory.
A number of brilliantly orchestrated Egyptian military gains alarmed the Israelis during the first week of war; Egyptian armor had advanced into the Sinai and was punishing the Israeli defense lines. Using RPG-7s, Egyptian infantry managed to cripple Israeli tanks. The Israelis, who arrogantly had not heeded intelligence reports of an impending war, were so convinced that this had become a battle for their very survival that rumors surfaced of a nuclear strike option.
However, and against the advice of his chief of staff, Sadat's decision to further advance without air cover allowed the Israelis to launch a counter-offensive (thanks partly to US resupply of weaponry) deep into Egyptian territory which turned the tide of war on October 14.
The later dismissed Egyptian chief-of-staff Saad El-Shazly maintains in his book The Crossing of the Suez (still banned in Egypt) that these tactical decisions on October 14 sealed Egypt's fate.
By October 17, the Israelis crossed the Suez and headed toward the Cairo-Suez highway and the port city of Ismailia.
The Syrians, who had also made gains against the Israelis, quickly began to suffer material and human losses; Israelis retook the Golan (still occupied to this day) and advanced through Syrian territory on October 15.
Some 30,000 Iraqi troops and armor rallied to prevent the fall of Damascus. Despite halting the Israeli advance toward the Syrian capital, they too suffered heavily.
By the time of an October 22 ceasefire, Israeli forces were on the outskirts of Ismailia. On October 23, the Israelis surrounded the Egyptian Third Army, which Shazly claimed was on the verge of collapse.
Although Egypt agreed to the ceasefire, the Israelis continued to shell and air raid the surrounded Third Army.
When disengagement began on October 28, the Egyptians were so desperate to resupply their Third Army with food that they hinted at the possibility of unprecedented direct talks with the Israelis.
Arabs today point at that conflict as testament to their unity and claim the military gains prove that they are not powerless.
Arab states which did not send military forces in time for the conflict contributed in materiel and funds; Libya, among others, gave Egypt $1 billion to procure armaments.
But initial gains can never accurately predict how the rest of the war will be waged.
By October 24, the Israeli Army was 80km from Cairo and 40km from Damascus.
Egyptian nationalists say the return of the Sinai was the goal and that they achieved that through negotiations and the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords. However, they could not have achieved even the initial military gains had Israel not been occupied with the Syrians in the strategically more important Golan theater.
Furthermore, the Camp David Peace Accords alienated Egypt for a decade, broke Arab unity and effectively shackled Cairo to a series of international agreements and protocols it can never violate for fear of losing billions of dollars in US economic and military aid.
El-Shazly later wrote: "This brilliant military victory was turned into a political defeat when Egypt was removed from the camp of resistance to Israeli occupation of Arab lands to the camp of appeasement."
In the 1970s, Egypt was the Arab superpower and the counterweight to Israeli military might. Its transformation from a military adversary to a diplomatic rival left a schism in the geopolitical map.
In 1975, the Lebanese Civil War erupted, tearing the socio-economic fabric of the country apart - the effects are felt to this day. In 1977, Egypt and Libya had a brief war of their own, while a year later Israel invaded Lebanon in pursuit of Palestinian fighters.
In 1979, the Shah of Iran was exiled to Egypt and the new theocrats in Tehran began to preach of an Islamic revolution to sweep the Middle East. A year later, Iraq and Iran went to war - Syria sided with the latter despite Baghdad's help in 1973 - and in 1982 Israel again invaded Lebanon in what would be an 18-year occupation.
The PLO was forced to flee to Tunisia.
In 1979, Egypt was kicked out of the Arab League, as Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Algeria vied for the role of "Arab superpower".
In less than a decade, any semblance of Arab unity had crumbled.
Nevertheless, Arab nationalists continue to mimic the propaganda of 1973 victories and have now applied the same mantra to the Israeli "retreat" from Lebanon in 2000, and what Hezbollah calls the Divine Defeat of Israel in 2006.
But wars are never fought solely on the front; they carry political, economic, ideological and public relations dimensions.
In the 37 years since this "victory", the Arabs have been unable to persuade Israel to agree to the, and have become absolutely impotent to prevent it from continuing the construction of settlements, which has effectively sliced up the West Bank.
What could have appeared as a Palestinian state in 1973 is today a series of nonviable cantons and refugee camps.
They could not prevent the Iraq-Kuwait row from escalating into an illegal occupation of the emirate.
They were unable to deter the US from invading Iraq in what everyone now knows to be a blunder; moreover, several Arab states allowed Washington to station troops and materiel on their soil.
The Arab League has been unable to break the siege and sanctions on Gaza since 2006, and has appeared indifferent to resolving the crises in Darfur, South Sudan and Somalia.
The destiny of the Middle East is today determined by three spheres of influence - Iran, Israel, and Turkey.
But in the 37 years since, the Arab World has little to show in terms of victories; in fact, the events stemming from the 1967 Naksa (disaster) and the October 1973 War helped create the Middle East mess we find ourselves in today.
The swift and decisive Israeli victory on June 6, 1967 unmasked the empty rhetoric of Pan-Arab nationalism.
Fawaz Gerges, an expert on Islamic jihadist organizations and author of The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, told me in 2007 that the 1967 defeat and its aftershocks "can be considered the most pivotal event which helps us understand why Islamic militancy has become a potent force in the region".
Disillusioned nationalists abandoned socialism in favor of Islamism, and the power of radical groups began to grow. This continues to be the trend today.
In 1973, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat planned to cross the Suez, penetrate the Israel Bar Lev defense line and hold ground for a few hours, proving that he could go the distance with Israel, while the US State Department pressed Tel Aviv to negotiate over the return of Sinai. Syria's Hafez Al Assad wanted to retake the Golan through a decisive military victory.
A number of brilliantly orchestrated Egyptian military gains alarmed the Israelis during the first week of war; Egyptian armor had advanced into the Sinai and was punishing the Israeli defense lines. Using RPG-7s, Egyptian infantry managed to cripple Israeli tanks. The Israelis, who arrogantly had not heeded intelligence reports of an impending war, were so convinced that this had become a battle for their very survival that rumors surfaced of a nuclear strike option.
However, and against the advice of his chief of staff, Sadat's decision to further advance without air cover allowed the Israelis to launch a counter-offensive (thanks partly to US resupply of weaponry) deep into Egyptian territory which turned the tide of war on October 14.
The later dismissed Egyptian chief-of-staff Saad El-Shazly maintains in his book The Crossing of the Suez (still banned in Egypt) that these tactical decisions on October 14 sealed Egypt's fate.
By October 17, the Israelis crossed the Suez and headed toward the Cairo-Suez highway and the port city of Ismailia.
The Syrians, who had also made gains against the Israelis, quickly began to suffer material and human losses; Israelis retook the Golan (still occupied to this day) and advanced through Syrian territory on October 15.
Some 30,000 Iraqi troops and armor rallied to prevent the fall of Damascus. Despite halting the Israeli advance toward the Syrian capital, they too suffered heavily.
By the time of an October 22 ceasefire, Israeli forces were on the outskirts of Ismailia. On October 23, the Israelis surrounded the Egyptian Third Army, which Shazly claimed was on the verge of collapse.
Although Egypt agreed to the ceasefire, the Israelis continued to shell and air raid the surrounded Third Army.
When disengagement began on October 28, the Egyptians were so desperate to resupply their Third Army with food that they hinted at the possibility of unprecedented direct talks with the Israelis.
Arabs today point at that conflict as testament to their unity and claim the military gains prove that they are not powerless.
Arab states which did not send military forces in time for the conflict contributed in materiel and funds; Libya, among others, gave Egypt $1 billion to procure armaments.
But initial gains can never accurately predict how the rest of the war will be waged.
By October 24, the Israeli Army was 80km from Cairo and 40km from Damascus.
Egyptian nationalists say the return of the Sinai was the goal and that they achieved that through negotiations and the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords. However, they could not have achieved even the initial military gains had Israel not been occupied with the Syrians in the strategically more important Golan theater.
Furthermore, the Camp David Peace Accords alienated Egypt for a decade, broke Arab unity and effectively shackled Cairo to a series of international agreements and protocols it can never violate for fear of losing billions of dollars in US economic and military aid.
El-Shazly later wrote: "This brilliant military victory was turned into a political defeat when Egypt was removed from the camp of resistance to Israeli occupation of Arab lands to the camp of appeasement."
In the 1970s, Egypt was the Arab superpower and the counterweight to Israeli military might. Its transformation from a military adversary to a diplomatic rival left a schism in the geopolitical map.
In 1975, the Lebanese Civil War erupted, tearing the socio-economic fabric of the country apart - the effects are felt to this day. In 1977, Egypt and Libya had a brief war of their own, while a year later Israel invaded Lebanon in pursuit of Palestinian fighters.
In 1979, the Shah of Iran was exiled to Egypt and the new theocrats in Tehran began to preach of an Islamic revolution to sweep the Middle East. A year later, Iraq and Iran went to war - Syria sided with the latter despite Baghdad's help in 1973 - and in 1982 Israel again invaded Lebanon in what would be an 18-year occupation.
The PLO was forced to flee to Tunisia.
In 1979, Egypt was kicked out of the Arab League, as Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Algeria vied for the role of "Arab superpower".
In less than a decade, any semblance of Arab unity had crumbled.
Nevertheless, Arab nationalists continue to mimic the propaganda of 1973 victories and have now applied the same mantra to the Israeli "retreat" from Lebanon in 2000, and what Hezbollah calls the Divine Defeat of Israel in 2006.
But wars are never fought solely on the front; they carry political, economic, ideological and public relations dimensions.
In the 37 years since this "victory", the Arabs have been unable to persuade Israel to agree to the, and have become absolutely impotent to prevent it from continuing the construction of settlements, which has effectively sliced up the West Bank.
What could have appeared as a Palestinian state in 1973 is today a series of nonviable cantons and refugee camps.
They could not prevent the Iraq-Kuwait row from escalating into an illegal occupation of the emirate.
They were unable to deter the US from invading Iraq in what everyone now knows to be a blunder; moreover, several Arab states allowed Washington to station troops and materiel on their soil.
The Arab League has been unable to break the siege and sanctions on Gaza since 2006, and has appeared indifferent to resolving the crises in Darfur, South Sudan and Somalia.
The destiny of the Middle East is today determined by three spheres of influence - Iran, Israel, and Turkey.
Egyptian Newspaper Fires Dissident Chief Editor
CAIRO — A leading independent Egyptian daily has fired its chief editor, an outspoken government critic, amid what journalists are calling a state crackdown on the media ahead of parliamentary elections.Ibrahim Eissa's dismissal from Al-Dustour, announced in the paper Tuesday, comes as uncertainty has grown over Egypt's political future, with parliamentary elections less than two months away and constant speculation about the health of 82-year-old President Hosni Mubarak. Presidential elections are set for next year.
Eissa had long been a vocal critic of the government. Last month he was pulled from a popular talk show he hosted on a private satellite TV station, which the Journalists' Union condemned as "an organized attack on media freedoms."
Before his firing from the newspaper, Eissa warned of a government campaign against any criticism in the media, especially in light of approaching elections that activists expect to be marred by widespread fraud.
"The Egyptian regime cannot give up cheating in elections, so the only solution for the authorities is to stop any talk about rigging, rather than stopping the rigging itself," Eissa wrote in an editorial in Al-Dustour on Sunday. "So the result is the silencing of satellite channels ... and then the turn of the newspapers will come."
Al-Dustour reported on its website early Tuesday that the paper's mogul publisher Elseyed el-Badawi fired Eissa on Monday. Eissa later told the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera TV that he was told by the publishers they were firing him because they are under government pressure over his writings.
"They want us to shut our mouths and be silent," he said.
At the paper's Cairo office, reporters reached by phone said they were the only ones who showed up for work Tuesday while editors and management staff were absent.
Later the journalists issued a statement saying that they rejected Eissa's dismissal. "Without Ibrahim Eissa the paper will be tasteless, colorless and odorless," said the statement posted on the paper's website.
Egypt Journalists Decry Government Media Crackdown
CAIRO — The Egyptian Journalists' Union has accused the government of cracking down on media critical of authorities after two popular talk shows were closed down.The closures come during a sensitive time for Egypt with parliamentary elections slated for November less than two months away and constant speculation about 82-year-old President Hosni Mubarak's health.
"There is an organized attack on media freedom in Egypt especially in light of the approaching parliamentary elections," said the statement obtained by The Associated Press Monday.
Egypt's media, especially television, were tightly controlled in the past and restricted to positive coverage of government activities. But an explosion of privately owned satellite stations over the past five years has brought programming that has pushed government boundaries when discussing politics.
The union's statement said that outspoken editor Ibrahim Eissa was pulled off his talk show without explanation and the 12-year-old program "Cairo Today" was also shut down. Both were broadcast on private television networks.
"This is no coincidence," said Mohammed Abdel Qudous, the head of the union's freedoms committee. "And as for the rest of the programs and talk shows, the owners were given orders to tone down."
Egyptian Minister of Communications Anas el-Fiqqi told The Associated Press that the closure of Orbit TV's "Cairo Today" had no political dimension and was only because the network had not paid its bills.
Orbit TV's Amr Adeeb acknowledged that there had been an "administrative misunderstanding" but pointed out that the network had since paid all its bills and the ban has remained.
"We have been operating in Cairo for 12 years. What has changed?" he told AP. "Does the voice of 'Cairo Today' need to be toned down? I have no answer."
ZipGenius 6.3.1.2612
Zip compression program with many features
ZipGenius is the absolutely free software for Windows that lets you compress files to almost any kind of archive. ZipGenius supports more than 20 compressed archive formats, including CD/DVD-ROM image files in ISO9660 standard.
This is the suite you were searching for: it is free and easy to use, plus it supports more than 20 formats of compressed archives, including RAR, CAB, SQX, ACE, ARJ,OpenOffice.org documents and the excellent 7-zip.
ZipGenius now can precompress executable files going to be added to a ZIP archive through the UPX compressor.
ZipGenius is presented in two editions: STANDARD and SUITE that differs for the content they ship to user's Desktop.
While the suite edition is the full setup package that includes all the optional modules of the ZipGenius project, because it is a setup layout oriented to experts and power users, the standard setup package just includes the main ZipGenius application because it is designed for most Windows users, that just want to open / compress / decompress archives in several formats.
DOWNLOAD HERE
This is the suite you were searching for: it is free and easy to use, plus it supports more than 20 formats of compressed archives, including RAR, CAB, SQX, ACE, ARJ,OpenOffice.org documents and the excellent 7-zip.
ZipGenius now can precompress executable files going to be added to a ZIP archive through the UPX compressor.
ZipGenius is presented in two editions: STANDARD and SUITE that differs for the content they ship to user's Desktop.
While the suite edition is the full setup package that includes all the optional modules of the ZipGenius project, because it is a setup layout oriented to experts and power users, the standard setup package just includes the main ZipGenius application because it is designed for most Windows users, that just want to open / compress / decompress archives in several formats.
DOWNLOAD HERE
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